In this paper I examine Hume's claims about the nature of moral sentiments (mainly in T 3.1.2) using as a foil the Kantian challenge to all material practical principles: they are all of the same type, being based on self-love and making all choices, including moral ones, hedonically fungible. The paper explores Hume's views on pleasure as constitutive of moral sentiment as an answer to that challenge arguing that for him only pleasure is essentially valuable for beings like us. It thus grounds a notion of value which, through a "progressive or dynamic" view of human nature, informs a conception of moral pleasure -a "taste in character traits" -as a distinctive type of pleasure that is not amenable to a mere quantitative criterium to guide moral choice.
Introduction
After putting the pro lem concerning the foundation of morality in his tec nical terms -whether it is by means of ideas or impres ions, tertium non datu , that we distin uish between virtue and vice (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 456 ) -Hume seeks to prove, in T 3.1.1., negati ely: "Moal distinctions not de i 'd from reason". Hume enjoys himself pursuing this part of his ar ument. If we take into account that its positi e part -the second section, which aims to show: "Moral distinctions de i 'd from a moral sense" -is architectonica ly based on the negative result and on the view that the alternatives are exclusive and exhaustive, we could we l find ourselves asking: does Hume consider the negative part the strongest (14 pages) or the positive part the weakest (practica ly 6 pages) ? Hume commences in T 3.1.2. the constructive part of his view, and presents the task thus: "The next question is, of what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do they operate upon us?" (Hume, 1978, p. 470) .
What is ecia ly striking is Hume's decisive attitude at first; but then, as a break in the push forwards, we get the circum ect development of the ap roach, as if the subject required it. Here we have Hume's main thesis:
Here we cannot remain long in suspense, but must pronounce the impression arising from virtue to be agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy (Hume, 1978, p. 470). This thesis concerns the positive and negative hedonic chara ers of our "impressions" of the objects of moral assessment. However, when Hume "has to be" more ecific about the nature of these impressions, he deliberately uses phrases -in one paragraph (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 471) , the same phrase four times ("particular" , once in italics) -which are general, un ecific 2 . The impressions in question "are nothing but particula pains or pleasures" . The view of an a ion, or a sentiment, or a chara er, as virtuous or vicious is due to the fact that it "causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind" . And "to have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfa ion of a particular kind from the contemplation of a chara er" in an agent. And "in feeling that [a chara er] pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous" .
In fact, in the sequel Hume (1978) continues to use terms that are not ecific: "a satisfa ion or uneasiness" (p. 471); "of that peculia kind" (p. 472); "a particula kind of pleasure" (p. 472).
Hume himself, then, presents an objection to his ar ument which is structura ly the same as the objection he had used against the rationalist position in the previous section: isn't it the case that "any object, whether animate or inanimate, rational or ir ational, might become mora ly good or evil, provided it can excite a satisfa ion or uneasiness" (Hume, 1978, p. 471 )? Hume' s answer to it comprises two observations. The first helps us a bit with the explanation of the nature of "moral pleasure and uneasiness"; the second see s to involve a petitio p incipii. These observations, however, a low us to see where the difficulties lie in relation to the positive part of Hume' s ar ument.
The first observation (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 472 ) reminds us that the term "pleasure" is in fact used, and in this Hume may mislead us (as if the issue concerned the brute phenomenology of sensations), to refer to many "sensations" which are different among themselves. Good music and a good wine are not going to be mixed up with virtue (I mean, the pleasure they provide). And a man who has "temper and judgment" can accept, in an example which fits the discussion better, that an enemy of his has got a beautiful voice. What we have up to this point are, however, only comparisons.
The second observation (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 473 ) sti l aims to distin uish what is peculiar about "moral pleasure or uneasiness" . As virtue and vice are in us or in others, they are features of human chara er, and as they excite a pleasure or pain, we can expect -from these two "circumstances" -that virtue and vice "must give rise to one of [the] four [indirect] passions" (Hume, 1978, p. 473 ). And we should bear in mind the purpose of this observation: "which clearly distin uishes [virtue and vice] from the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate objects" (Hume, 1978, p. 473) .
However, if we want to explain the ecific hedonic nature of "moral pleasure and pain" with the fact that we feel pride or humility, love or hatred, with our virtues or vices or with those of others -that is, using the fact that the indirect passions can also have as their causes moral features -then, it seems, we should not sup ose, as Hume does, the "circumstance" that virtue and vice excite pleasure and pain inde endently, which is what ena les them to be such a causal factor. Because it was precisely this circumstance that Hume was out to explain in the first place, including with the present reminder of a such we l-known fact.
The Kantian Challenge
Kant ar ues against sentiments in at least two of the three main roles, which he discusses, they could play in mo-rality. The first is their distin uishing role. We would use sentiments to mark, in the philosophical phrase Kant uses, "the ecific difference between virtue and vice" (cf. Kant, 2002, p. 442 (Kant, 2002, p. 442-443) .
It is quite interesting to notice that Hume, in turn, stresses this ecific role of sentiments, and is clearly intent on making a lot out of it. Hume aims to avoid the threat to morality that is similar to a false taste in aesthetic ap reciation. In section 8, "Of the sources of a legiance" (part 2, "Of Justice" , of Book 3), Hume has three distinct wor ies about morality. One is philosophical concerning the origin of moral o ligation (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 546-547) , another is the wor y about degrees of virtue and vice in the sentiments and chara ers of agents. In relation to the latter, Hume commits himself, in a typical empiricist fashion, to a ecific epistemological conviction: at the basis of this process of attesting the degrees of virtue and vice is the relia le operation of our sensibility.
Hume states that what is decisive is that we feel pleasure or pain in the contemplation of people's sentiments and chara ers, and this pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels them (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 457) . This strong epistemological thesis licenses the claim that there wi l be as much reality in virtues and vices of a person's sentiments and chara er as there is pleasure and pain in a ectator's contemplation, and there is no possibility of a mistake in this regard. Thus Hume says: "[…] there is just so much vice or virtue in any chara er as every one places in it, and that it is impossile in this particular we can ever be mistaken" (Hume, 1978, p. 457) . I wi l come back to this text later on.
However, as to the objecti ity of moral distinctions based on sentiments -how they work as ways of distin uishing moral features -, Hume is certainly more optimistic than Kant. We can see this in the footnote he puts on the point: (Hume, 1978, p. 547n) .
The second role of sentiments Kant discusses in relation to morality is crucial for my purposes. This is the justificatory role. We are dealing here with what from Kant' s point of view is essential to morality, i.e., laws which have the feature of "absolute necessity" -being just for this reason mora ly valid (cf. Kant, 2002, p. 389) . What is needed for our fu l understanding of the nature of morality is that we have availa le a satisfactory philosophical explanation of "the ground of o ligation" (cf. Kant, 2002, p. 389 (Kant, 2002, p. 425) .
The third role of sentiments in relation to morality in Kant's thinking wi l be briefly mentioned only for the sake of the whole picture. It is much less negative. For Kant, we are natural rational animals in relation to which it does not make sense to seek to get rid of our sensibility. However, its cor ect relation to morality has a neces ary effect, because ecifia le a p io i, which is the Kantian moral sentiment, i.e., re ect, this sui gene is sentiment produced rationa ly by concepts. Kant's conception of this sentiment is based on his view that there is in us an undenia le natural self-love, which has to be disciplined in the form of a rational self-love; and on his view that there is a natural progression of this form of love, which is censura le when not mora ly disciplined, towards moral arogance, an attitude which in turn must be who ly annulated, because it is in principle incompati le with the categorical imperative 3 . I should sti l mention the four natural predispositions, which we can know are necessarily in us (their consciousness is not of empirical origin), that are at the basis of morality and are the subjective conditions for the receptivity of the concept of duty (featured for the first time as such in the late Metaphysics of Morals). They are the moral sentiment, conscience, love for other human beings and re ect (cf. Kant, 1996b, p. 399-404) . But let us now return to Kant's criticism of the view that sentiments could have a role in the justification of morality, which involves what I claim is a cha lenge to a position such as Hume's.
The Kantian cha lenge to Hume's position is to be found in the first two theorems and their proofs in the C itique of Pra ical Reason. The first theorem states that a wi l -as Hume seems to conceive of it -is inevita ly always determined e pi ically, never satisfying the desideratum of qualifying for a pure will. Theorem 1 reads:
All practical principles that presuppose an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will are, without exception, empirical and can furnish no practical laws (Kant, 1996a, p. 21) .
Theorem 2 puts in abstract terms what the pro lem is with a l empirical or material principles which are geared towards the matte of the faculty of desire, i.e., its connection with the p inciple of pleasure as the rationale for the determination of choice. Theorem 2 reads:
All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come under the general principle of self-love or one's own happiness (Kant, 1996a, p. 22) .
Let us look closer at Kant's conception of an empirica ly determined wi l. Two issues need to be taken into account in order to grasp Kant's ar ument against sentiments playing a role in the justification of morality.
In the first place, the proof of theorem 2 (cf. Kant, 1996a, p. 22 ) e a lishes a connection between the principle of human natural hap iness and pleasure in such a way that the account of a l empirical pra ical principles as of "one and the same type" fo lows, that is, a l of them are hedonica ly oriented. Human natural hap iness is understood as the consciousness of an agreea leness of states in life that accompanies uninter upte ly the whole of a being's existence (p. 22.). And someone who makes this hap iness her pra ical p inciple uiding her choices is in fact orienting herself exclusively by hap iness as her only alue. This involves a ecific type of determination of the faculty of desire, i.e., the expectation of pleasure with the existence of an object determines the desire for it because of the rece ti ity of the subject in relation to the object -receptivity because pleasure depends on the affection of our sensibility by an object. For this reason material pra ical principles, which are geared towards "existing" objects of the faculty of desire, can only determine it through its receptivity, through the desire uided by the expectation of pleasure.
In the second place, Remark 1 to the Coro lary of the theorem in question (cf. Kant, 1996a, p. 22-25) makes explicit that pleasure is exclusively the principle of choice when we choose in view of the empirical objects of the faculty of desire. Kant begins by pointing out the mistake of trying to keep apart a lower faculty of desire and a superior faculty of desire by distin uishing the origin of the representation of the object which wi l offer us pleasure, traditiona ly, the senses and the understanding re ectively. It is a mistake because if what is of interest is the pleasure (the satisfa ion) we wi l get with the object, then it does not matter wherefrom we get the representation of it, whether from the senses or the understanding. For Kant, the crucial point is the "determining ground of the wi l". It does not matter from which faculty the representation of the object comes as long as the representation has its role in leading to a ion by presup osing "a feeling of pleasure in the subject". The representation's capacity to have the pra ical effect that is a ion depends exclusively on the receptivity of the subject, of her being "agreea ly affected by the representation". (Kant, 1996a, p. 23) .
The ar ument is as fo lows: if we, when deciding or choosing, look for whatever material object in our search for pleasure (existent or that wi l exist as a consequence of our a ion), then, (1) we can not cognize, except empirica ly, a poste io i, whether the object in question wi l provide us the gratification sought; and (2), concerning the principle determining the choice among objects, we can not have any other c ite ium except the quantity of gratification we expect.
Kant presents his examples of choosing of lesser goods in place of greater goods to e a lish his point (a text which reminds us of Hume's famous examples, used for quite different purposes). (Kant, 1996a, p. 23) .
The fact that in a l these cases it is the sa e human being certainly shows that one option in each pair of possibilities is not justified. But Kant aims to i lustrate what a mistaken pra ical orientation makes inevita le: hedonism. Realistica ly, these cases hap en, but if human beings only choose because of the expected pleasure from the satisfa ion of their desire, then the only c ite ium for choice is the amount of pleasure with the choice made. If the basis of choice is the pleasure sought, then the source of the representation of the object does not matter. "The only thing that concerns him, in order to decide upon a choice, is how intense, how long, how easily acquired, and often repeated this agreea leness is" (Kant, 1996a, p. 23 ). Kant's ar ument, then, is simply: if the principle of the determination of the faculty of desire is empirical, then the consequence wi l be the undesira le inevita leness of a hedonism of choice, that is, the fungibility of a l forms of pleasure 4 .
It is important to note the rationale for this ar ument. It is clear that Kant aims to show that sentiments can not be a source of objetive values 5 . However we should be clear about the nature of the Kantian ar ument against giving to sentiments any role to play in the justification of morality. According to Kant, the problem with empirical pra ical principles is not that they are forms of egoism, or the seeking of satisfa ion as such (self-love), also not the egoism which seeks advantages in a l choices; rather, the pro lem is trying to make the search for satisfa ion, self-love, a pra ical law, that is, aiming to do it, because this cannot be done, given that empirical pra ical principles can not rid themselves of a condition of self-reference in value: what is of value for me ends up just being what is of value to me (Cf. Herman, 2005, p. 24) . As Barbara Herman says: "[...] whatever principle one makes the supreme for one' s choice marks what one takes to be of highest value. If an agent who desires hap iness makes the p inciple of hap iness her supreme determining ground of choice, it is a mark not just of self-love, but of self-conceit. Her first value in a ion is then her own pursuit of her own hap iness" (2005, p. 24) . It is impossi le for these pra ical principles to be objecti e pra ical principles -they cannot contain objective value (which is not relative to the subject who values). The Kantian cha lenge, then, is the fo lowing: without objective value a l we can have is a hedonism of choice, which is unaccepta le.
However, it is also important to note that the Kantian cha lenge need not be accepted in Kant's own terms. In fact, I wi l claim that Hume has much to say about this difficulty from his own philosophical per ective.
Hume on the Nature of the Moral Sentiment
The central question of T 3.1.1. -whether it is by means of our impressions or our ideas that we make "moral distinctions" -see s to be an e iste ological question. This would be borne out by Hume's claims: (i) "[...] since vice and virtue are not discovera le merely by reason [...] it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion that we are a le to mark the difference betwixt them" (Hume, 1978, p. 470) .
(ii) "Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg' d of " (Hume, 1978, p. 470) . (iii) "Now since the distin uishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but [...]" (Hume, 1978, p. 471) . (iv) "We do not infer a chara er to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous" (Hume, 1978, p. 471) .
However, I think that something more important than that comes across in these statements by Hume, and it bears on the nature of the "impressions" by means of which we make the moral distinctions 6 . In my view, Hume at this point commits himself to a conception of the source of moral alue. What experience a lows us to see is what is at the basis of morality. Let us return to the point with which we began. Concerning the nature of moral sentiment we saw Hume stating: [...] (Hume, 1978, p. 470 (Hume, 1978, p. 546-547). This passage makes two points: (1) The opinions of men, which have a peculiar authority when it comes to morality and which are "in a great measure infa li le" , a low us to state what the sou ce of morality is: "The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain which results from the view of any sentiment or chara er" (Hume, 1978, p. 546 , my emphasis). (2) As this pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, "there is just so much vice or virtue in any chara er as every one places in it, and that it is impossi le in this particular we can ever be mistaken" . This second point expresses Hume's e iste ological conviction, which I mentioned above apropos Kant on the role of sentiments in morality. But, as a consequence, the first point must be about the nature of moral good and evil, about what according to Hume constitutes them fundamenta ly, about what is at their basis so as make them of value.
When Hume has to deal with the nature of moral sentiment, the orientation of his thinking regarding the conception of value comes out at least in its main features, so that this conception a lows him a particular view of the origin of morality. First, Hume quite clearly refuses "the question of human nature" , he refuses to contemplate the excluding options that human beings are by nature either virtuous or vicious and that we could determine this by a ecial gift of detection (Cf. Gi l, 2006, p. 203-205) . In the section in question, in answer to the question "From hat p inciples is it [this pain or pleasure] de i ed, and hence does it a ise in the human mind?" , Hume claims that it is absurd to think that in each particular case the (NB) "sentiments" should be produced by "an o iginal quality and p imary constitution" . This is a clear refusal of a moral innatism: there are not "original" instincts enough for the number and complexity of our moral duties (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 473 Hume, 1978, p. 473-476) . In this re ect, Hume's position is not that morality comes to life ready-made from "original" principles of human nature, as is claimed by both rationalists, on the one side, and by moral sentimentalists, on the other. Rather, Hume claims that it springs from our intera ions with one another and with the empirical world, and therefore depends on the features of our make-up and on our situations in the world (Cf. Gi l, 2006, p. 214-225) . This implies a view of human nature which Michael Gi l ca ls "progressive or dynamic" , whereas Hume's predecessors held a 6 Pace: "Treatise Book 3, Part 1, is best read as an epistemology of value: an account of how we become aware of the moral properties, rather than an account of the semantic status of moral judgement [NB: perhaps this contrast attenuates my point]. The moral sensing view is an interpretation of this moral epistemology" (Cohon, 2008, p. 101-102) . However, Cohon's main point is that "the moral sensing interpretation [holds] that for Hume our basic awareness of vice and virtue is a direct apprehension by feeling. In the standard case, we grasp good and evil directly, by experiencing the sentiments of approval and disapproval" (2008, p. 103). 7 Rachel Cohon comes closer to my type of worry when she says that "as for their nature [virtuousness and viciousness], that is not specified. We feel them and form beliefs about whatever properties feel that way, but what they are in themselves is not spelled out. But this is too quick.
[…] Hume has inter alia made commitments in places to some claims about the nature of good and evil" (Cohon, 2008, p. 113) . But then the list is admittedly negative, saying what moral properties are not, and then Cohon goes back to her epistemological interests. view which was "static" (Cf. Gi l, 2006, p. 227) . This dyna ic per ective is also noticea le in Hume's claim about the peculiarity of moral sentiment which shows up in its ecial effect: the indirect passions. Let's go back to this issue.
At the beginning of the paper, I presented a difficulty with Hume' s reasoning about this, a petitio in his claim that this fact could help clarifying the peculiarity of the moral sentiments. Seeing Hume' s account as dynamic a lows us to solve the problem. As long as Hume can use our experience (the first-person one) that pride and humility with our chara ers, or our moral qualities, and love and hatred with that of others can have ecific causes (technica ly eaking: Hume' s understanding of "cause" here, so that the point point does not concern the phenomenology of the passions, but rather their intentionality), then he can claim, in view of his theory of the dou le relation of impressions and ideas in the explanation of the origin of the indirect passions, that this effect of virtues and vices requires the independent and, in this regard, prope hedonic chara er of the moral sentiment (which constitutes the awareness of virtue and vice; in fact, the mechanism gets started by the satisfa ion with irtue and the dissatisfa ion with ice): a form of pleasure or pain entertained in the contemplation of our chara er or that of others. In this way, the associationistic dynamics dissolves the difficulty when Hume ap eals to this causal phenomenon. And we should not play down the importance Hume gives to this: "And this is, perhaps, the most considera le effect that virtue and vice have upon the human mind" (Hume, 1978, p. 473) . That is: rather than the effect being an expected normative one at first, it is rather simply the occur ence of certain passions, in part as a consequence of the hedonic chara er of the "cause" of pride or humility in this case.
But the dyna ic or progres i e per ective can also help us with the ap reciation of what in Hume lies at the basis of alue in morality.
The Rationale for Moral Value in Hume
There are many cases which prove the ap eal to a dynamic per ective in Hume's analyses in the Treatise. I wi l consider one which wi l lead me to the core of Hume's view on value. I wi l describe the beginnings of Hume's ar umentation aiming to e a lish the "first law of nature" that concerns justice, i.e. the convention about the stability of possession.
Human beings are the most dependent animals, they are needy but helpless. We need clothes and dwe lings to protect ourselves against the weather (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 484-485) . As individuals, we are (1) too weak to do any considera le work by ourselves; (2) una le to improve our abilities to considera le levels; and (3) destined to "inevita le ruin and misery" .
Society is the only solution to these "inconveniences" . It is the remedy for these "defects" . "By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability encreases: And by mutual succour we are less expos' d to fortune and accidents. 'Tis by this a ditional fo ce, ability and secu ity, that society becomes advantageous" (Hume, 1978, p. 485 (Hume, 1978, p. 486) .
What saves us is one of our natural necessities: sexual desire or the "natural ap etite betwixt the sexes" . This is "the first and original principle of human society" . It is clear that it has this beneficent effect not because of its productive chara er. What hap ens is that the desire which unites man and woman is relia le enough to the point where "a new tye takes place in their concern for their common offspring" . This is the "natural affection" towards their children, which in turn, being developed and nurtured, gets to the point of becoming a "custom and habit" which "operat[es] on the tender minds of the children" . This is what "makes them sensi le of the advantages, which they may reap from society, as we l as fashions them by degrees for it, by ru bing off those rough corners and untoward affections, which prevent their coalition" (Hume, 1978, p. 486) .
What hap ens in the sequel in this natural history of human society is that a "contrariety of passions" develops, a true "op osition of passions" . With regard to our "natural temper" , the important point is not that we are egoists, but rather that our generosity is limited and partial. We are generous first and mainly to our family and friends. As Annette Baier helped us to ap reciate, Hume is here again at his cheekiest (Cf. Baier, 1991, p. 200) : "But though this generosity must be acknowledged to the honour of human nature, we may at the same time remark, that so no le an affection, instead of fitting men for large societies, is almost as contrary to them as the most nar ow selfishness" (Hume, 1978, p. 487) .
What saves us at this stage of development are our "outward circumstances" . There is a type of good for us, i.e., those "things" (Hume ca ls them the "external goods") that we may acquire by "our industry and good fortune" which have the features of (1) being an unsta le possession, without suffering any alterations or losses by their mere easy transfer, and (2) being scarce in view of our needs and desires. But how can this help us?
It is not by ap eal to "our natural uncultivated ideas of morality" (Hume, 1978, p. 489) . What hap ens with these is that they rather "conform themselves to that partiality [of our affections], and give it an a ditional force and influence" (Hume, 1978, p. 489) . These ideas simply fo low "the natural and usual force of those several affections, which are directed towards [others]" . "[...] As every immorality is derived from some defect or unsoundness of the passions, and as this defect must be judged of, in a great measure, from the ordinary course of nature in the constitution of the mind" (Hume, 1978, p. 488) , in this rega d (in this area of our "natural familiar relations") we nat-ura ly fo low this partiality. So, there is a natural partiality in our affections which has an influence on "our ideas of vice and virtue" in this area. The consequence is that we judge unaccepta le what does not conform to the "ordinary course of nature" either by excessive partiality or by detached impartiality. We lame individuals who are too partial towards their family and who are too welcoming to a "mere chance acquaintance" . Therefore, these can not be the ideas that could help us with the pro lem of cor ecting the natural partiality of our passions. The solution is something that is the product of "judgement and understanding" with regard to those "external goods": an "artifice" , a "convention" aiming "to be ow stability on the possession of [them]" . So, we should pay careful attention to what is the nature of the "contrariety" , the "op osition" of passions that is solved by the convention which gives stability to possession. Given their scarcity and the instability of their possession, our passions in regard to them enter in conflict with our newly developed "new affection" for society when we become sensile of its advantage, an affection which gets at this point fu ly expressed in our ap reciation of "company and conversation" . The fact is that our generosity (of the natura ly limited type) with relation to the "external goods" is what militates against the newly developing "affection" for society.
However, this natural hum[e]an history, which we are inclined to think is so plausi le, is ultimately based on what? Why is it that the minds of children are so sensi le to the advantages of society?
We have seen that Hume refuses, in the second section, some sort of moral innatist naturalism, the position that we are formed by nature with some "original quality" , as for example "the love of mankind, merely as such" , a kind of universal love for human beings merely as suc (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 481) 8 , mentioned at the beginning of his treatment of justice. Against such a position, Hume (1) claims, quite realistica ly, that such passion is not to be found in the human mind; and with this he (2) reveals an axiological commitment: this "universal affection to mankind" would be, unbelieva ly, "independent of personal qualities, of services, or of relations to ourself " (Hume, 1978, p. 481) .
The latter point is crucial to my claim. Hume is not only realistic, but he also bases the moral value of beneficence on the interchanges of services or facilities which crysta lize in personal qualities. Hume hereby positions himself against the Kantian point about the constitutive limitation of empirical or material conceptions of value, the condition of self-reference, which makes what has value in relation to me into what is of value for me. Hume clearly commits himself to the inevita le self-reference of value, which is not deemed damaging to its satisfactory conception. But why exactly, what is the rationale for the point that the "love" for others depends on services, on the relations, to us?
In my view this can be found in what has been du bed a metaphysical hedonism by Peter Kail (2007, chapter 8) 9 . This is the view that only pleasure is essentia ly valua le and only pain is essentia ly worthy of aversion (cf. p. 177). This view is quite distinct from a psyc ological hedonism, which is the position that a l our a ions are motivated by the desire for a future pleasure of the agent (cf. p. 179). Accordingly, metaphysical hedonism is not a thesis about what is in fact desired or not (pleasure, for example, with the emphasis being on the explanation of a ion), but is a thesis about what is es entially of alue and is because of it desira le on its own, that is, it is a thesis about what deserves to be desired or avoided (cf. p. 183).
This position is sensibilist, for our conception about value arises from our familiarity with our impressions of pleasure and pain, which are for us essentia ly valua le and non-valua le re ectively. According to Kail, this position is realist, if only "in a very limited sense" , about (N.B.) what is essential value. "There are states that are desira le or aversion-worthy, a beit states of consciousness" (2007, p. 183) 10 . A crucial evidence for ascribing to Hume this metaphysical hedonism is his ar ument in Ap endix 1 of the Enquiry concerning the P inciples of Morals. Hume ap eals to pleasure and pain to put a stop to a regress of justifications in a case of pra ical reasoning (cf. Hume, 1975, p. 293) . Why does someone exercise? To keep healthy and so to avoid i lness, which is painful. Why does he hate pain? It is not possi le to give a reason for this. Or someone is trying to keep healthy so as to be a le to work, to get money, to have pleasures. Why? Again, there cannot be a reason for this. (Hume, 1975, p. 293) . 8 Cf. Hume (1978, p. 619 ) for Hume's point that his system of sympathy only has advantages over other naturalist innatist systems (especially Hutcheson's). 9 Kail (2007, chapter 8) : "The Gold: Good, Evil, Belief and Desire". 10 This feature seems to me to be compatible with Cohon's anti-realist view of Hume's position, given that a moral realist would hold, according to her, that "ethical properties (such as good and evil, virtue and vice, or right and wrong) exist independently of human psychological reactions to the entities (such as people and actions) that are thought to bear these properties" (p. 99). According to Cohon, Hume's is a "moral sensing view": "moral properties are emotion-dependent [they are 'reaction-dependent'], yet we can think and talk about them in a perfectly sensible way [in a 'true-cognitivist' way: moral judgements are truth-evaluable and some of them are actually true (p. 98-99), the same way we talk about other things" (p. 129). In the same vein, I think Cohon's comments on the anti-metaphysical interpretation of Humphrey Morris and Charlotte Brown -Hume is neither realist nor anti-realist -are also congenial to my view: in spite of the issue realism-anti-realism, Hume "thinks we grasp moral good and evil by the process of feeling certain sentiments" (p. 120). I would just add: it does not concern, in the first place, epistemology.
Kail says that the role of pleasure and pain is that of presenting "ultimate ends" that cannot be explained by reason, but which experience constitutes as such for us (cf. 2007, p. 188-189) . In this regard, the ar ument has to be based on "a normative view of the role of pleasure and pain" , they are going to be seen as desira le or aversion-worthy on their own sake. The only alternative would be to see Hume's ar ument as being a defense of psyc ological hedonism. This hedonism would aim to explain a l desire as oriented towards pleasure, our own pleasure, which would amount to the "philosophical chemistry" that Hume criticizes in the doctrine of self-love in the second Ap endix of the second Enquiry. The ar ument rather concerns what has essential value, and so fa can explain desires and aversions. Hume states: "Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes hap iness or misery, becomes a motive to a ion, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition" (Hume, 1975, p. 294, my emphasis) 11 . As to the point of there not being a reason for our affection towards pleasure and for our aversion towards pain, it seems to me that this view also helps to explain Hume's shocking anti-Hutchesonian thesis presented in his three famous examples (Cf. McIntyre, 2009 (Hume, 1978, p. 416). It is clear that Hume's purpose is not to endorse the preferences we would intuitively judge to be unjustified, but rather to register that (1) there is something ultimate concerning our hedonic experiences that is not accounta le by reason, and (2) they are -in ordinary parlance -"ir ational" because of a reflection conducted by "calm passions" and not by a reasoning process conducted by reason 12 . (Hume, 1978, p. 418) .
But if this is so, then we wi l not find in Hume what Simon Blackburn has du bed a "monotonous hedonism" ("fit only for pigs") 13 , or also a monolithic hedonism. The satisfa ion or pleasure with the moral sentiment which ap roves including strength of mind in us can present a for of pleasure that can win over promises of violent pleasure in the present and in the future. But this implies that there are qualities of pleasures, and therefore that the sheer quantity of pleasure is not the only c iteium for our decisions which amount to "determinations of the wi l" , according to Hume' s point of view. Against the Kantian cha lenge, Hume does not accept -holding instead a metaphysical hedonism, a "material" position for sure -the inevitability of hedonism of choice as Kant understood it 14 . It seems to me that this position is part of an Aufklärung's project, but of a rather Scottish type, which accomplishes the 11 Apropos of this argument, Baier concentrates on the relations between the agreeable and the useful. However, her main claim is that "such intrinsically valued things are what Hume terms 'directly agreeable', as contrasted with the indirectly agreeable, the 'useful'". As "the useful is the indirectly agreeable, the expected means to the directly agreeable [,] this seems to make the agreeable the more basic category, 'agreeable' the name for the more ultimate good" (2009, p. 252, my emphasis Hume] together show that calm reflectiveness, and in particular, our ability to use one desire to limit and regulate another, is an activity directed by our calm passions and not by reason. Reflectiveness about the consequences of acting on a propensity or passion involves the use of reason, but reflectiveness needs to be motivated by passion too, just as actions do". 13 Blackburn (2001, Part Two, Section 11, p. 82) . Blackburn criticizes Mill's somewhat Victorian view that introduces the different dimensions of "quality" of pleasures: "This betrays Bentham by introducing some other source of value than the pleasure itself". In spite of this, "Mill's main point remains, though, that anybody concentrating upon happiness or pleasure can remember the indefinite variety of things in which human beings take pleasure, or the indefinite variety of things they enjoy" (p. 82). A rather Humean point! 14 Cf. Schneewind (1998, p. 524) for the place, differently occupied, where a common road leads to: "For Hutcheson and Hume, approval by the moral faculty makes certain motives virtues; and it is quite possible that Kant read Shaftesbury as saying no more than that moral goodness, on that view, is not discovered by the moral faculty but constituted by it. The moral sense is then like the Pufendorfian divine will that creates moral entities. Although the world without the moral feelings would contain motives directed toward the benefit of others, it would contain no moral attributes. It is a neutral universe, and only our response to it makes it otherwise. If our approval is what makes some motive good, others bad, then we are not subject to error as we would be if we had to know an objective Order in God's mind, or an objective degree of perfection. And if our own approval makes motives good, then, despite Hobbes, when ordinary people test the proposed motives by the law, they are not using some secondhand criterion of morality given them by an authority. We can all determine what is right because our own feelings make it right. Kant plainly agreed with this voluntarist aspect of sentimentalism although he rejected the sentimentalist account of approval. But the knowledge involved in Kantian morality as autonomy is knowledge of the self's own way of thinking". prizing of our sensibility in the form of a ta e that affords us genuine pleasures and pains. In Baier's dictum: "for morality, to him, is a matter of taste in chara er traits" (Cf. 1991, p. 250) . Pleasure and pain may, therefore, be seen by Kantians in too limited a fashion, even when they admit they should not be altogether avoided and must rather be structured mora ly, that is, put in the framework of morality, which nonetheless may seem to Humeans to be framing them inexcusa ly moralistica ly 15 .
